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considerations. Rather, it appears that there were at least two more specific reasons for asserting civilian control. First, some in the new Bush administration believed that civilian control had eroded under President Bill Clinton. 5 They felt that the problems with the military were a result of "eight years of no discipline during the Clinton-run Pentagon." 6 Second, Rumsfeld was seeking fundamental changes in the way the military operated -transformation is the buzzwordand felt that could not be accomplished by relying solely on the military. 7 A think tank report warning that the Pentagon had been working on position papers for some time and could stall any efforts at significant change fueled this concern. 8 These two issues -lax control under
Clinton and transformation -combined with a business orientation, served as the impetus for
Rumsfeld's actions.
Civilian Control During the Review Process
Rumsfeld's conduct of an initial strategic review of the military, and the congressionally mandated Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), provide examples of how he sought to assert civilian control. These two reviews are closely related in time and purpose, but are discussed separately to highlight different methods of civilian control. 9 Initial Strategic Review. That Rumsfeld immediately undertook a strategic review of the military should not have come as a surprise to anyone. In a September 1999 speech at the Citadel, then candidate George W. Bush declared that he would conduct a comprehensive review of the military. 10 Rumsfeld echoed this in his confirmation testimony before the Senate. 11 The controversy and insights on civilian control do not revolve around the decision to have a review, but rather the manner in which it was conducted.
From the beginning, Rumsfeld made it clear that he was in charge and wanted to keep tight control on the Pentagon and the review process. Reflecting the "no talk" orders were the two major characteristics of the review process:
limited military involvement and secrecy. The review was accomplished through a variety of panels set up to look at particular issues, such as conventional forces, transformation and acquisition. It was difficult to determine the exact number of panels -with estimates ranging from 12 to 21 -some of which were only one person writing a very specific report. 14 The military's limited role in the review was presaged by OSD's decision to ignore significant work the JCS had done in preparation for the QDR. 15 This was followed by the exclusion of active duty military personnel from formal participation on the review panels. This exclusion also largely applied to civilian employees of the Pentagon. 16 All of the panels were chaired by civilians -most from outside the Pentagon -including retired military. 17 Active duty military "participation" was limited to responding to specific factual or technical questions from some of the panels.
The number of participants on these panels was kept to a minimum and buffered by a wall of silence, as those involved were "sworn to secrecy." 18 Even the names of panel members were supposed to be kept secret. In most cases, active duty military -including those who provided information -never saw the final reports from these panels. The focus on secrecy was based on before being considered within the Pentagon.
This secrecy and limited military involvement led to much uncertainty and speculation.
The military wondered whether the review was merely an "independent assessment" or an attempt to replace the QDR. 20 The media could not always get it straight. For example, it erroneously reported for several months that Andrew Marshall, the head of the Office of Net Assessment who was chairing the important strategy panel, was in charge of the entire review. 21 The truth was, the review was a set of disparate and contradictory reports and recommendations that did not provide for coordination among the panels, nor an overall look at the military.
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Toward the end of May, the initial strategic review came to an end and Rumsfeld decided to "fold it" into the formal QDR process. 23 In so doing, much of the initial review was ignored by those involved in the QDR.
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QDR. The QDR is a congressionally mandated, 25 comprehensive review of national defense strategy and military force structure. The first QDR, conducted in 1997, was a disappointment to many and seen as a document that justified business as usual. 26 Rumsfeld wanted this QDR, in light of the call for transformation, to be different. This was reflected in the manner in which it was accomplished, if not in the final product. Time was an issue, since by law the QDR had to be given to Congress no later than September 30.
The QDR process began after an apparently stormy meeting on May 22 between Rumsfeld and the JCS, in which Rumsfeld expressed his frustration over leaks during the initial review and the JCS responded with criticisms over being excluded from the review process. Rumsfeld agreed to meet "every working day" for the next week with the JCS, to be followed by "intensive discussions over the next six weeks to hammer out a new defense strategy." 27 While military involvement in the QDR was much greater than during the initial review, there are different perspectives on the military's impact on the QDR. On the one hand, there is substantial evidence that, through various meetings, there was significant military input and participation in the process and the senior military leadership was given an opportunity to provide comments that were incorporated in the final document. 30 On the other hand, some felt the military was marginalized in a top down process controlled by civilians who wrote the documents, and that many of the meetings with Rumsfeld were one-sided, with Rumsfeld doing all of the talking. 31 This belief may be a reflection of the mistrust sown during the initial strategic review.
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Time was a constraint. The September 30 deadline did not allow for significant analysis 33 and may not have given the JCS sufficient time to prepare for meetings and provide informed opinions. 34 Some of those involved blame Rumsfeld for "wasting" months on the initial review process and speculate that this was planned to limit the time for and military involvement in the QDR. Time pressures contributed to what most agree was a watered-down and nontransformational QDR 35 that deferred many critical decisions. 36 Complaints over the QDR were muted, however, because it was eclipsed by the events of September 11 and did not immediately jeopardize any significant programs.
Responses by the Military and Congress
The reactions of the military and Congress to Rumsfeld's efforts to exert control, particularly during the initial review, were a result of feeling left out of the process. One general summed it up for many in the military by quipping that "We've been left out of the loop." 37 Members of Congress "complained that they, like the military, had felt excluded from the process." 38 Upset at being excluded or ignored, the military grew "increasingly worried," 39 first over the process and then the substantive decisions that were seemingly being made in their absence.
While the complaints initially may have stayed inside the Pentagon, information began to be leaked to the press and Congress. The complaints and leaks seemed to build during late March and April, spurred on by Rumsfeld's testimony in Congress and the late April/early May due date of reports under the initial strategic review. 40 The complaints and leaks dissipated after the JCS/Rumsfeld May 22 meeting and with greater military involvement in the QDR process. This was, however, only a temporary lull. The complaints and leaks started up again in July and August, focused on significant substantive decisions. with your review, we hope you will consider our strong opposition to any proposal that would seek to diminish the current levels of Army force structure." 48 As a result, Rumsfeld postponed any decisions regarding force structure cuts. 49 By that time, however, Rumsfeld's approach had fostered an alliance between disaffected military and Congress. 50 That alliance and preemptive strikes by Congress -based on leaks and rumors -did not bode well for relations between Congress and DoD, and undermined Rumsfeld's review and authority.
The Service Secretaries and the Senior Executive Council
Reflecting his business experience and orientation, Rumsfeld has tried to assert a particular type of civilian control through his choice of service secretaries and the way they manage DoD.
Although there was speculation that Rumsfeld purposefully delayed some appointments to avoid "turf protection" by new appointees 51 -the service secretaries were not sworn into office until late May/early June -it appears that he got exactly what he wanted with his three service secretaries. 52 All three had significant corporate experience, and were known for having revitalized their companies. Grumman. In that position, he was the "architect of Northrop Grumman's conversion from an airframe maker into an electronics powerhouse." 54 (Roche is also a retired Navy Captain.)
Gordon R. England, Secretary of the Navy, was the executive vice-president of General
Dynamics who "cut F-16 costs as orders declined." 55 Thomas E. White, Secretary of the Army, was Vice Chairman of Enron Energy Services. He was commended for slashing the workforce by 40%, while converting Enron from a "stodgy pipeline company into a dynamic energy concern." 56 (White is also a retired Brigadier General.) Navy Secretary England declared that the service secretaries "are here to fundamentally improve the business practices of the Department of Defense and our respective services, and we will work together to do that." 57 The business approach was to be developed through a Senior Executive Council (SEC), established in June. Proposed to act as a board of directors, 58 SEC members include Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, the service secretaries and Edward C. "Pete" Aldridge, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. The role of the SEC is to "implement modern business practices in the department and to guide transformation efforts in the services." 59 Making the Pentagon more business-like was brought closer to the working level by the establishment, also in June, of the Business Initiatives Council (BIC). Chaired by Aldridge, the BIC will "recommend good business practices and find and implement cost savings." 60 While its actual function and impact seem unclear -due in part to the events of September 11 -there appears to be renewed interest in a modified SEC. Recent DoD documents note that under the SEC "political appointees would be given a larger role in the Pentagon's crucial programming, planning and budget process." 61 The SEC will meet twice a year to help develop the Defense Planning Guidance. While the CJCS may be included on the SEC, the revised role of this group would appear to strengthen civilian -service secretary -control over the military.
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Budget Decisions
Many interpreted the "help is on the way" slogan to mean that there would be an (immediate) infusion of money to the military. 63 There was much disappointment when the funding increases -both for the fiscal year 2001 supplemental and the 2002 budget -were not as big or quick as expected. This was because Rumsfeld had decided early in the process that any significant budget increases would only come after the review was conducted. 64 In part this may reflect the priority given to tax cuts. Nevertheless, presidential spokesman Ari Fleischer, speaking of the decision to defer the supplemental request, made it clear that it was "'a signal of fiscal discipline' and an assertion of civilian control over the military." 65 By not just "throwing money" at the military, this "strategy first" decision complemented the business practices approach of the service secretaries.
Post-September 11 Assertion of Civilian Control
Criticism continued to build, and by late August many were predicting the end of Rumsfeld and his efforts to transform the military. 66 Rumsfeld's stature, however, has risen significantly because of his performance since the September 11 terrorist attacks. While less overt, there have been some discrete steps -besides the potential resurgence of the SEC noted above -that would appear to further civilian control. The most significant steps taken toward asserting civilian control, however, relate to the highly lauded performance of the seemingly omnipresent Rumsfeld since September 11. Taking center stage in the strategy and prosecution of the war in Afghanistan, he has become the face and voice of the U.S. military, in large part through the more than 100 press conferences and interviews he has given since September 11. 70 Not only has Rumsfeld conducted a large number of press conferences personally, he is often seen at the side of General Tommy R. Franks, Commander in Chief, Central Command, during the latter's press conferences. 71 All this has the effect of demonstrating that the Secretary of Defense -a civilian -is in charge of the war and the military. As one senior senator noted recently, this increased stature and prestige should provide "tremendous clout" and bode well for changes Rumsfeld wants to make at the Pentagon. (Duffy) . Kissinger, well-respected for his political skills, noted that "Rumsfeld afforded me a close-up look at a special Washington phenomenon: the skilled full-time politician bureaucrat in whom ambition, ability and substance fuse seamlessly. (Dettmer) (Rumsfeld is heeding advice of RAND Corp. transition paper warning that uniformed military had prepared documents justifying "more of the same."). 9 Much of this discussion is based on the author's interviews in early January 2002, with two military officers stationed at the Pentagon during the review process and knowledgeable about the matters discussed in this paper. (Military interviews A and B. ) Unless otherwise noted, they are the source of the information and will not be cited, except for assertions that may not be commonly known or accepted. 10 Thomas E. Ricks, "For Rumsfeld, Many Roadblocks," Washington Post, August 7, 2001, 1 (Ricks, August 7) ("As president, I will begin an immediate, comprehensive review of our military covering the structure of its forces, the state of its strategy, the priorities of its procurement."). 11 
